The next meeting between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping, expected in Washington on 24 September, could produce commercially meaningful results without resolving the underlying trade disputes. The immediate opportunity appears to be a combination of selective tariff relief, extensions of temporary arrangements and improvements in market access. A comprehensive removal of trade barriers would be a substantially larger undertaking. AP’s pre-summit reporting

For businesses, the most useful question is therefore more precise than whether relations are improving: which measure might change, for which products, under what conditions and for how long?

That distinction matters because the current framework contains several different policy states. Some measures have been terminated. Others remain legally in place but are temporarily suspended. Certain products benefit from exclusions. Further reductions are still being negotiated.

Treating all of these as a single “trade truce” obscures both the opportunities and the risks.

The starting point has changed since the 2025 deal

An important correction is needed before discussing possible tariff cuts: the United States’ 2025 emergency-tariff structure is no longer an adequate description of the current legal position.

On 20 February 2026, Executive Order 14389 ended the additional duties imposed under the specified International Emergency Economic Powers Act orders, including the China fentanyl-related and reciprocal-tariff orders. It expressly left other tariff authorities, including Sections 301 and 232, unaffected. Those terminated IEEPA duties should not be presented as merely awaiting renewal under the November trade-truce deadline. White House executive order

Subsequently, USTR’s July 2026 forced-labour-related Section 301 action imposed a 12.5% additional tariff on covered Chinese products, subject to specified exceptions. This is a separate legal measure, rather than the continuation of the former IEEPA tariff under its old name. USTR final action, China determination

The implication is significant: a diplomatic commitment to maintain a broadly stable tariff burden can coexist with changes in the legal instruments used to impose that burden. Importers need to identify the applicable tariff layers rather than rely on a single headline “China rate.”

What is paused, what has ended, and what remains negotiable?

The following identifies major arrangements relevant to the summit. It is not a product-specific duty calculation.

The distinction between these categories is commercially important. Extending a suspension avoids a prospective increase; it does not necessarily reduce today’s costs. Terminating one additional tariff does not eliminate every duty on the product. An exclusion can be valuable while remaining narrow and temporary.

Where tariff reductions look most plausible

The clearest established negotiating channel concerns non-sensitive goods.

USTR’s consultation on the proposed U.S.–China Board of Trade envisages reciprocal modifications affecting an equal value of imports. It specifically asks which products might qualify for lower tariffs, including ordinary most-favoured-nation rates, and considers effects on consumers, domestic producers and supply-chain resilience. This points towards product selection rather than an across-the-board rollback. USTR Board of Trade consultation

China’s May explanation similarly described discussions covering $30 billion or more on each side, with agreed products potentially receiving MFN rates or lower. It also identified agricultural market access as part of the negotiating agenda. These were prospective arrangements requiring further agreement and implementation. MOFCOM’s explanation of the May outcomes

Our assessment is that the stronger candidates would be products for which both governments can explain an immediate domestic benefit without appearing to compromise a strategic priority. Relevant considerations could include limited alternative supply, costs imposed on downstream manufacturers, consumer-price effects and identifiable export opportunities.

That is a selection framework, not a forecast product list. A commercially ordinary item could still prove politically sensitive because of domestic production, employment or supply-chain considerations.

Equally, $30 billion of covered trade is not $30 billion of tariff savings. The savings would depend on the products selected, their actual import values, the tariff layers removed and the conditions attached.

Critical minerals: predictability may matter more than formal deregulation

A further extension of suspended measures could be valuable even without a broad relaxation of China’s export-control framework.

MOFCOM has stated that China continues to administer controls on rare earths and other critical minerals and reviews compliant civilian licence applications. The suspension of specified announcements therefore should not be interpreted as unrestricted access to all relevant materials, equipment or technology. MOFCOM’s statement on critical-mineral licensing

For manufacturers, a more predictable licensing process may have greater operational value than a modest tariff reduction. Lower duties help only if the input can actually be shipped.

A meaningful summit outcome could therefore concern the reliability of supply: clearer eligibility, more consistent processing or workable arrangements for recurring civilian transactions. These possibilities should be assessed through subsequent administrative practice, rather than inferred from general statements about cooperation.

Tariff relief and new pressure could arrive together

It would be a mistake to assume that selective concessions necessarily imply the abandonment of other trade actions.

USTR opened a separate Section 301 investigation into structural excess capacity in March 2026, including China. In August, AP reported that a 7.5% China tariff was under consideration. That reported figure should be treated as a negotiating and policy risk, not as an established payable rate on the basis of the report alone. USTR investigation announcement; AP’s report on the proposal

This creates a plausible mixed outcome: relief for selected products alongside maintained or additional pressure elsewhere.

Our inference is that such an outcome could serve both governments’ political objectives. Each could present targeted gains while retaining instruments intended to address industrial or security concerns. For a company, however, the result could be a lower cost on one product and an unchanged—or higher—cost on another.

The relevant unit of analysis is the transaction, not the tone of the communiqué.

Three scenarios worth planning around

1. Continuity with limited deliverables.
The leaders reaffirm the relationship, direct further technical work and make progress on extending temporary arrangements. Some immediate commercial announcements may accompany the meeting, while detailed tariff changes follow later.

The confirming signal would be implementing notices and revised expiry dates. Positive diplomatic language alone would not establish a change in treatment.

2. A targeted relief package.
The governments announce an agreed non-sensitive product framework, potentially accompanied by agricultural market-access measures and clearer implementation arrangements.

The decisive evidence would be tariff-line coverage, specified reductions and effective dates. A framework announcement without those details would remain a step towards relief rather than relief available to an importer.

3. A mixed or delayed outcome.
Negotiations continue, but relief is narrower than expected, some deadlines remain unresolved, or a separate trade action proceeds.

This would not necessarily mean a complete breakdown. It would mean businesses face continued differentiation between products and policy instruments, with less certainty about the next implementation step.

These scenarios are not assigned numerical probabilities. The available evidence supports conditional pathways more convincingly than precise odds.

How to judge whether the summit changes the business environment

A useful post-summit assessment should answer five questions:

1. Coverage: Which products, entities and transactions are included?

2. Legal effect: Has a measure been terminated, suspended, excluded or merely placed under discussion?

3. Timing: When does the change begin, and what event determines eligibility?

4. Duration: Is relief permanent, time-limited or subject to review?

5. Residual restrictions: Which other duties, licensing requirements or market-access conditions remain?

The most consequential result may be a longer and more usable planning horizon rather than a dramatic headline reduction. Businesses can benefit from knowing that an arrangement will remain workable through their procurement and delivery cycle.

The summit should therefore be judged by how far its commitments become usable terms for trade: published product coverage, dependable permissions, clear dates and arrangements that survive the next shipment.

Cover photograph: President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping in Busan, 30 October 2025. Archival image; Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok. Photo source.